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Introduction 
 
The World financial turmoil, that beset emerging economies during much of 1997 
and culminated after the Russian crisis in the second half of 1998, presents an 
interesting test case for economic policy in an open economy. Israel's policy 
response was radical, and - with the benefit of hindsight - successful in 
maintaining and reinforcing stability, when the odds of many emerging 
economies, such as Israel, were clearly at risk. Indeed several emerging markets 
suffered a severe setback in output, a deep and sometimes contagious fall in the 
value of stocks and a sharp depreciation in their exchange rates, when the world 
financial crisis evolved. National policy mistakes were punished by rapid capital 
flight, spearheaded by foreign investors and accompanied by a loss of these 
countries' international creditworthiness. 
The first section sets the background for open economies at the end of the 1990s: 
a precipitation of globalization in financial markets, led by the rapid advance in 
information technology. The integration of world capital markets has brought 
about a rapid change in the rules of the game for national economies that seek to 
increase their share of financial and direct investment in the international financial 
market. 
The second section focuses on Israel's economic developments preceding the 
World financial crisis. This section emphasizes the importance of timeliness of 
policy actions. Economic fundamentals can be changed by economic policy, but 
only in a slowly breeding process, whereas financial crises by their very nature 
can hit economies sharply, instantly and typically unprepared. If the economies, 
which suffered from the crisis, had expected it, the crisis would probably never 
have developed in the first place. 
The third section describes the shock of world financial turmoil on the Israeli 
foreign exchange market and its immediate impact on the inflationary process on 
the background of Israel's exchange rate regime. The section ends by a discussion 
of the policy reaction and some short and long term economic consequences.  
In the last section lessons for economic policy are drawn from Israel's experience 
during world financial turmoil. 
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1. Globalization and Sovereign Credit Rating 
 
The functioning of world financial markets in a globalized environment have been 
fundamentally changed over the 1990s. Two forces have brought about this 
change: (1) a gradual liberalization of foreign exchange controls and deregulation 
of domestic financial markets, (2) the technological breakthrough in the 
information industry and its increasing application in the financial services 
industry.  
These processes have sharply reduced frictions for capital flows among capital 
markets all over the world. A frictionless world involves potential economic 
gains, but at the same time potential risks: Global, as distinct from national capital 
markets, are not well organized. There are no powerful supranational institutions 
to ascertain efficient law enforcement. Lenders facing a defaulting borrower 
cannot easily seize his assets. Markets provided a powerful answer to these 
deficiencies. They react in due time to information on changes in sovereign 
default risk. Markets substitute for the lack of legal sanctions, by using a 
combination of the price of the service and the quantity supplied. The increment 
above the price on the alternative riskless investment (say, US government 
bonds3) of a comparable maturity. The premium affects the cost of financing 
investment of the business sector and of their government seeking to cover budget 
deficits. A more stringent means of limiting the demand for funds is a quantity 
limit. The difference between the risk premium and a "country limit" is often only 
semantic. In times of financial turmoil, the size of bond issuance reacts swiftly to 
changing risk conditions. The market reaction of limiting the defaulting 
borrower's future access to the international capital market, has been interpreted 
theoretically as a market substitute for legal difficulties and disproportionate costs 
of ensuring the fulfillment of property rights in cases of default on international 
financial investments or loans.4 
The process of globalization has added significant vulnerability for firms and 
governments, which are rated as "low investment or speculative grade" issuers of 
debt. The US "High yield market" attracts many borrowers from all over the 
                                                 
3 The yield of US or UK government bills, bonds and notes is considered a reasonable 
benchmark of a "safe investment" and the sovereign risk premium is typically defined as 
a surplus on such a safe financial investment. 
4 See Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). 
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world, many of them from emerging markets. The world financial turmoil is best 
captured in the development of the risk premium (the "spread") and the drying up 
of the supply, immediately after the Russian government's default in August 1998. 
These indicators of crisis reacted more or less instantly. The related collapse of 
the (large) US based Long Term Capital Management Fund - a few weeks later - 
added to the shrinking availability of funds for such high yield investment. As the 
chart shows the impact has been prolonged and carried over into the year 2000. 
Since then issuance has not reached the high levels that characterized the period 
before the Russian crisis. 
 
At first, particularly in the first weeks after the eruption of the crisis, there was a 
precipitated and unqualified outflow of investment funds from Emerging Markets 
towards less risky Western financial markets. 
However, with the passage of time international investors realized that there are 
important differences in the economic fundamentals not only between emerging 
and developed economies but also within the group of "emerging markets".  
Yield spreads for certain countries, such as Argentina, which maintains a currency 
board, and Brazil widened by 15 percentage points immediately after the eruption 
of the Russian crisis. The impact effect - in the second half of August - was 
similar for example for Argentina and Brazil, whose degrees of vulnerability 
certainly differ from each other, indicating an unqualified rush out of Emerging 
High Yield Market - Issuance and Spread
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market bonds, disregarding any difference in quality between the countries' 
fundamentals. However, selectivity surfaced shortly thereafter with the risk 
premium for Argentine, falling to about half that of Brazil. 
Israel's sovereign risk spread increased only modestly in the wake of turmoil, 
compared to some other emerging markets, for which spreads were measured 
during this incidence (eg. China and Hungary). Israel's premium reacted similarly 
to such well-behaved advanced economies as, for example, the Canadian province 
of Quebec. This is a good indicator for the relatively mild effect that world 
financial turmoil had on Israel. Its risk premium peaked with a delay of several 
weeks, growing from about 0.4 percent before the crisis to 1.4 percent in October 
1998, and falling back to 0.9 percent in early 2000. The present article 
demonstrates that this result was achieved by Israel's sound economic policy 
reaction. 
Exchange rates and stock prices reflected swift signals of the crisis. This 
vulnerability appeared mainly - and vehemently - in countries with exchange rate 
regimes, that maintain demanding exchange rate commitments of direct official 
intervention.  
As can be seen in the following two charts, the Israeli exchange rate developed in 
line with exchange rates of emerging markets, that succeeded in avoiding a crisis. 
Israel's equity index (in real terms) weathered the World financial crisis 
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successfully. The index even caught up later on with the stock price index in 
developed economies. 
 
The sensitivity of foreign investors to economic fundamentals in emerging 
markets has created a market demand for sovereign risk evaluation of emerging 
economies. Firms, specializing in sovereign risk evaluation such as Standard & 
Poors, Moody's and Fitch IBCA, provide such risk evaluations. Emerging 
economies that wish to borrow and attract foreign investment funds, have an 
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incentive to convince the new “jury" of economic performance (i.e. the rating 
agencies) of the soundness of their macroeconomic fundamentals compared to 
those of other countries, competing for investment funds. 
The winners will be those that demonstrate a better economic performance than 
their competitors. They will enjoy lower risk premia (spreads), higher credit 
ratings and more foreign investment.  
National economies with a perceived weakness in their economic fundamentals 
are penalized and investors' confidence gets hampered. Advances in information 
technology have strongly reduced the reaction lag. In the age of instant flow of 
electronic information, important information gets spread simultaneously 
throughout world financial centers. 
In such a rating-sensitive global environment, a country's economic performance 
becomes the major tool for an emerging economy to compete for the share of 
foreign investment with other countries. An economy will thus be considered 
more attractive, the more disciplined its economic policy is and the more stable its 
economic situation. As a rule, economic policies aimed at strengthening market 
efficiency are rewarded with a better rating, and a larger and cheaper supply of 
international funds. 
 
2. Growth and Sustainability - the Case of Israel 
 
In the 1990s geopolitical events took place, that left a deep and positive mark on 
the Israeli economy. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s caused a 
major influx of new immigrants to Israel. The crumbling of the Soviet Union as a 
superpower and the Gulf war also bore deep geopolitical changes in the Middle 
East, which eventually paved the way for the Madrid conference for peace 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors in late 1991. The peace process was further 
accelerated with the signing of the Oslo-agreement between Israel and the PLO in 
1993. 
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Economically, the mutual and official political recognition mitigated the 
effectiveness of the long standing direct and indirect Arab boycott5 on Israeli 
exports.  
Another important source of growth in the Israeli economy in the 1990s was the 
implementation of various economic policy reforms. Focusing on reforms became 
possible only after the successful implementation of the stabilization plan in mid 
19856. 
The reforms carried out after the stabilization program included a profound 
process of tariff reduction, capital account liberalization, privatization and 
deregulation of financial markets. All these reforms were carried out gradually 
over several years. The privatization has been somewhat hesitant and still needs to 
be completed. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The direct boycott forbids any business contacts with Israeli firms. The indirect boycott 
threatens international firms, maintaining business with Israeli firms, with sanctions 
concerning trade with Arab countries, as described in Gottlieb (1993). 
6One of the most central steps of the stabilization plan was to reduce the public sector 
deficit. It declined from an average annual deficit of 14.5% percent of GDP in Israel's so 
called "lost decade" (1974 to 1984) to a surplus in 1985 and an average deficit of only 1% 
of GDP in the second half of the 1980s. Inflation, helped by a freeze of the exchange rate 
to the Dollar, dropped from near hyperinflation to a little less than 20 percent in the late 
1980s.  
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The three forces - immigration, the peace process and major economic reform 
efforts - constitute the major underlying causes for Israel's rapid economic growth 
in the first half of the 1990s. The economy grew rapidly, particularly in the years 
1992 to 1995 with exports growing at more than 11 percent and much faster than 
world trade (6.8 percent), investment at 7.4 and GDP per capita at 3 percent 
(annual averages). In 1994 and 1995 GDP reached as much as 7 percent and grew 
by more than 4 percent per capita. Exports expanded much faster than world 
trade, investment continued to grow rapidly, despite its sharp acceleration (it rose 
by 68 percent in the previous two years) during the height of the immigration 
wave. Monetary conditions at the outset of that period were strongly expansionary 
and in the years 1992 and 1993 monetary policy was gradually and hesitantly 
tightened: From January 1991 until the end of 1992 the average real expected 
interest rate was about zero.7 Since then the average real interest rate rose slightly 
to 1.7 percent between January 1993 to November 1994.  
Alas, that rapid pace was unsustainable. During 1994 the first signs of overheating 
appeared - inflationary expectations doubled within less than a year from about 7 
percent to almost 15 percent by the end of the year and inflation rose from about 
10 to 15 percent (see Frenkel, 1997). The Bank of Israel began to tighten 
monetary policy already in October 1993, raising the interest rate from its low 
point of 9 percent in several steps to 17 percent in December 1994, in an attempt 
to subdue inflationary pressures. From April 1994 till the end of that year, 
monetary tightening was particularly sharp. The effective rate was raised by 7.4 
percentage points, to an effective rate of 18.5 percent at the end of the year. Over 
that period the expected real interest rate grew from 3.1 percent in April to 5 
percent in December. 
However, fiscal policy became strongly expansionary. Though the fiscal deficit of 
1994 was well within the target according to the "law of the diminishing domestic 
deficit" (see discussion below), the good performance was due to a transitory 
surge in tax revenues (from taxes on real estate sales). The government used the 
                                                 
7As explained below, monetary policy underwent important strategic changes during the 
1990s. From a policy with an exchange rate anchor and an almost unnoticed inflation 
target in 1992, the exchange rate was gradually made more flexible and the inflation 
target gained gradually in  importance. Since about 1994 the Bank of Israel's base rate 
became the major tool for fighting inflation. See also the Bank of Israel Inflation reports 
and Gottlieb and Ribon (1997). 
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temporary revenues in order to finance an excessive real wage increase of about 
20 percent within three years (1994 to 1996) in the public sector. These 
constituted an inherently permanent expenditure increase. The deterioration in the 
government deficit was thus only a matter of time. Already in 1995 the 
government's domestic deficit deviated, for the first time, from the path prescribed 
by the law. 
 
 
 
 
In the same year the current account deficit in the balance of payments exceeded 5 
percent of GDP, a level that has often been referred to as a "red line" for adequacy 
of a country's external accounts (chart 7). 
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Unemployment had dropped relatively sharply, from more than 10 percent in the 
early 1990s8 to less than 7 percent in 1995. Economic activity was expanding 
beyond capacity. In the euphoric atmosphere of the Oslo peace agreement, the 
tight policy intended to cool down the overheated economy was disapproved by 
many. When it had become clear that the fiscal stance was getting out of control, 
the Central Bank urged the government to take corrective action in the budget 
policy for 1996. However in the political turmoil around the assassination of late 
Prime Minister Rabin, the upcoming elections and a general unwillingness to take 
the necessary steps, no such action was chosen. The budget deficit climbed further 
and exceeded the law's prescription by even more, reaching as much as 4.7 
percent of GDP in the inflation-adjusted deficit, and an even higher deficit by 
internationally comparable definitions9. By mid 1996 the then newly elected 
government decided to postpone the budget cut to the year 1997 (see chart 6).  
 
                                                 
8 The sharp rise in unemployment in the first two years of the 1990s was mainly due to 
the large influx of immigrants following the delayed slowdown in the economy in the late 
1980s in response to the stabilization plan. 
9 Israel's definition of the government deficit departs from the internationally accepted 
definition by excluding the adjustment for inflation in interest payments. 
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A. On the Utility of the Budget Deficit Law 
 
The Israeli law of the diminishing budget deficit was conceived during 1991 as a 
response to worries that the large government expenditure, needed for absorbing 
the immigration wave. It was feared that the immigration wave might cause a 
renewal of huge public sector deficits, as had been typical for the 1970s and first 
half of the 1980s - a period of prolonged economic crisis. The law was intended to 
convey to the markets that the deficits in 1992 to 1994 (the first three years of the 
law) were planned to be temporary and that equilibrium would be restored until 
1995. The idea was to keep the definition of the law as simple as possible, 
excluding only one item (government loans). That was the reason for disregarding 
the cyclical adjustment in tax revenues and cyclically sensitive expenditure items 
(such as unemployment benefits) in the law. Simplicity was also the reason why it 
was decided to include only the Central Government, thus excluding, for example, 
budget deficits of the local authorities. Furthermore, there was no prescription for 
automatic government action in case of a violation of the law.  
It was argued against the law that it is biased towards expanding expenditures, 
since for example transitorily high revenues (such as in 1994) can be spent 
without violating the law, whereas violations of the law will simply be 
disregarded (such as in 1995). Furthermore it has been argued that the parameters 
of the law were changed too often, thereby weakening its public clout. As a matter 
of fact the law was changed three times over the years 1993 to 1999, as can be 
seen from chart 8. 
  
12
 
From a zero deficit target for 1995, set in 1992 when the law was first applied, the 
government's ambition to reach budget balance, successively weakened.  
The first change of the law was to adapt a more lenient path, requiring the deficit 
to diminish by at least a quarter percent of GDP per year. 
The second change not only involved the targeted numbers, but also definitions: 
From 1997 onwards the definition was widened to include also the foreign 
exchange component of the government account - in addition to the domestic 
deficit. In principle, this was a sound decision from a macroeconomic point of 
view, but the timing was somewhat self-serving, since the envisaged (but 
previously unexpected) technical foreign currency surplus10 allowed the 
government a higher than previously targeted domestic deficit. In 1997 and 1998 
the government managed to keep the deficit within the limits of the law. 
The third change of the law was done for the year 2000 budget. The law was 
relaxed to allow for a total deficit of 2.5 percent instead of the original 1.75 
percent of GDP. With the benefit of hindsight it seems that this was an 
                                                 
10 A more stringent consolidation of the Central Bank's profits into the Government 
accounts should include also the domestic "cost" of monetary policy. That would make 
sense if the Central Bank was given full monetary autonomy. This would optimally 
include the Bank's autonomy to intervene in the foreign exchange market. At present 
(March 2000) the Bank is forced to intervene whenever the exchange rate hits the 
boundaries of the exchange rate band, thus forcing it to buy foreign exchange at the 
strong end of the band. 
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unnecessary change, since 1999 turned out to be very close to the preset target of 
2 percent and the forecast for 2000 seems also to be well in line with the previous 
target range. This relaxation of the law was considerable, since it implied a 
cumulative divergence of some 2 percent of GDP (about 2 billion NIS or 0.5 
billion US-$). 
Formally it is tempting to call the law a failure, since it was relaxed whenever it 
was considered hard to achieve. However, the experience with the law should be 
viewed in a "political economy" context: Albeit soft, the law has repeatedly 
proved an extremely useful tool in the public discussion on fiscal policy. It 
supplied the Bank of Israel, who, on top of its monetary responsibility, is also the 
government's economic adviser - with a powerful quantitative grip on this crucial 
fiscal policy tool. The law gave the Central Bank a quantitative point of 
orientation, basing its demand for fiscal restraint on a previous strategic 
government decision, thus rendering the criticism of the budget deviation more 
legitimate and thus more effective. Indeed, in a longer term perspective the 
average public sector deficit (which includes the local government deficit among 
other items) fell from more than 4 percent of GDP in the 4 years preceding the 
law to about 2.5 percent in the 8 years since the law has been in place. 
From the macroeconomic perspective11 the budget discipline has improved, much 
due to the existence of the law. 
 
B. Credit Ratings and Economic Policy - the Case of Israel 
 
Israel's credit rating has undergone large swings. The rating as captured in the 
"Institutional Investor"-index12 (II-index) began to drop rapidly in the early 1980s 
with the deterioration of Israel's economy in those days. Despite the profound 
improvements in Israel's economic policy and performance in the years 1986 to 
1993 the rating according to this index more or less stagnated. S&P started to rate 
Israel at BBB-, only slightly above the unpleasant "Speculative-Grade Ratings". 
                                                 
11 Regarding the expenditure composition the consolidation of the budget remained 
unsatisfactory. 
12 This index is constructed by the periodical "Institutional Investor" from a bi-annual 
survey of some 100 leading international banks. They are asked to rate countries' 
creditworthiness on a scale from 0 to 100, 0 representing those with the greatest chance of 
default. The responses are then weighted, giving a higher weight the larger the loan 
portfolio and the more sophisticated the monitoring system of the respondent.  
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Israel's experience during the late 1980s and early 1990s provides a good example 
for the well known fact that a good reputation can be easily damaged but is much 
harder to build up again. From its low point in 1985 it took about seven years to 
convince rating agencies to improve the rating to the level achieved in early 1996 
of "strong payment capacity"13 within the "investment grade"-rating in the late 
1990s.14  
Ratings by all three rating agencies improved by a quantum change with the 
advancement in the peace process (Chart 9). Interestingly, the improvement of 
Israel's creditworthiness continued in the period 1996 to 1998, despite the 
stalemate in the peace process. This indicates that the importance of improved 
economic fundamentals in the determination of Israel's creditworthiness has been 
growing in recent years. Statements by major credit rating agencies validate this 
impression.15 
The inflation rate has long been recognized as an important determinant of a 
country's creditworthiness. Maybe because it represents an overall indicator for 
the quality of economic policy management. Chart 10 emphasizes the negative 
correlation between credit rating and inflation for Israel. Such a relationship 
between inflation and creditworthiness has been found in many studies on country 
risk.16 
                                                 
13See Cantor and Packer (1996a)  
14 S&P and Moody’s typically publish ratings for emerging economies when a country 
intends to issue bonds internationally.  
15 Excerpts from Standard & Poor’s Credit Rating for Israel (November 4, 1998):  
Israel’s ratings are supported by a diversified and well-developed economy…, by 
substantial progress in structural reforms, particularly bank privatization and capital 
account liberalization, the government’s strengthened commitment to fiscal consolidation 
and price stability, tight monetary policy, …, a robust international liquidity position and 
declining public sector external indebtedness, …advancements in the peace process, 
which remain susceptible to setbacks, are critical for long term economic prosperity in 
Israel and the region, …strong diplomatic and  financial support from the U.S. 
16 See for example Cantor and Packer (1996) for a recent study, McFadden et al. (1986), 
and Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992). Creditworthiness is affected by several variables; 
among them the level of the economy's development (proxied by the GDP p.c.), the 
external debt and foreign exchange reserves (ratios), fiscal variables, default history, 
political variables and more. 
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3. Israel's Policy Response to World Financial Crisis17 
 
The Russian crisis and the collapse of the Long Term Capital Management Fund 
hit the Israeli economy by surprise. It is well known that the turmoil created a 
general outflow of investment funds from Emerging Markets towards less risky 
Western financial markets - particularly in the first weeks after the eruption of the 
crisis. This severely reduced the access of Emerging Economies to World 
financial markets. Israeli financial assets, which are also included in various 
Emerging markets Portfolio Investment indices, were also automatically reduced 
at the height of World financial turmoil18. 
The rush out of "emerging market investments" was distinctly felt in Israel's 
foreign exchange market in early October. As can be seen in chart 11, this effect 
manifested itself in the Israeli context by a sharp turnaround in portfolio 
investment. 
                                                 
17 As described extensively in Corsetti et al. The South East Asian financial crisis of 
1997/8 was to a large extent due to unsound banking practices in many of the crisis 
countries. Israel's banking system has improved and is generally sound since the major 
banking crisis of 1983. 
18 Such funds are called Investable composite indices. Merrill Lynch, for example, 
included Israeli stocks in its IFC index in November 1997 with 2.4 percent. These include 
a variety of prominent Israeli businesses in all sectors of the economy. In times of 
financial turmoil, fund managers receive orders to reduce investors' exposure. The 
worldwide sale of funds triggers an automatic demand for foreign exchange in the 
national markets of the index countries. 
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However foreign direct investment (FDI) to Israel remained high also during the 
months of world financial crisis. They even surged in 1999, hinting at the long run 
fundamental strength of the Israeli economy, as perceived by foreign investors. 
This general outflow of investment funds from emerging markets triggered the 
sharp depreciation of the 'New Israeli Sheqel' (NIS) exchange rate to the US-
Dollar in early October 1998. This depreciation was considerably reinforced by 
the business sector’s attempt to reduce foreign exchange exposure, which had 
been accumulated over time, when exchange rate variability had been artificially 
reduced by the exchange rate mechanism. The depreciation reached about 10 
percent within a few days.  
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During the turbulence in the foreign exchange market the Central Bank decided 
not to carry out direct intervention in the foreign exchange market. This decision 
rapidly became the focus of a heated public debate. A widely accepted view in 
favor of direct intervention in foreign exchange markets during financial turmoil 
is the desire to uphold an orderly exchange market. The Bank reacted by non-
intervention based on its assessment that in spite of the large and volatile changes 
in the exchange rate, the market conditions have been orderly. The volume of 
transactions was large, spreads were not unreasonably large, and price quotations 
could be obtained continuously. In reality, the trading volume was found to be the 
highest ever recorded for Israel at the time (about 6 billion US-dollars within a 
week). 
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Obviously it would have been a mistake for the Central Bank to promise an 
unlimited supply of foreign exchange in a market, open to world financial 
markets. Instead, the market cleared and some of the depreciation proved to be 
temporary. An important consequence of the decision not to intervene directly in 
the foreign exchange market has been the reduction of moral hazard. Indeed 
following the episode, a certain reduction in the business sector’s foreign 
exchange exposure could be observed. Market participants have become 
increasingly convinced of the inherent risks pertaining in foreign exchange 
markets in periods of increased international exchange rate volatility. This 
learning process eventually enhanced the demand for risk insurance, thus 
providing the necessary incentive for financial mediators to supply market 
instruments for insuring against excessive exchange rate risk (chart 14). 
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A. The Exchange Rate Regime and Global Integration19 
 
The flexibility of the foreign exchange regime is one of the most important 
preconditions for a successful stabilization policy in the era of globalization and 
financial vulnerability.  
The Israeli experience provides a good example of a gradual exit policy from a 
rigid exchange rate regime, geared at stabilizing near hyperinflation in the mid 
1980's, towards a highly flexible one, fitting a globally integrated capital market 
with price stability at the beginning of the 21st century. 
During the years of world financial crisis, 1997 and 1998, Israel has adhered to its 
long run strategy of foreign exchange liberalization - in contrast to other 
countries, that have cut back on their commitment to liberalization (e.g. 
Malaysia). In Israel this strategy has remained in place since the late 1980s after 
successful stabilization. Moreover during 1997 and particularly in May 1998 
Israel moved on to dismantle further remaining constraints on the free flow of 
capital. There was much public argument about the desirability of continuing the 
                                                 
19 For a detailed account of the political economy aspects of stabilization, the exchange 
rate system and competitiveness see for example Frenkel (1997). 
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process of capital account liberalization. The Bank of Israel consistently favored 
its continuation, simultaneously pushing for more flexibility in the foreign 
exchange market.20 
 
Over the years Israel's foreign exchange regime has come a long way. In October 
1977, on the background of an utterly unstable economy, the exchange rate was 
allowed to float freely and the capital account was radically liberalized. Due to 
total failure, the reform was abruptly cancelled and succeeded by tight capital 
controls. It took another 8 years of a prolonged and severe economic crisis, which 
culminated in a severe balance of payments crisis and a stock market crash in 
1983/4 and nearly 500 percent inflation by mid 1985. At that stage it was decided 
in the context of the aforementioned comprehensive stabilization plan to freeze 
the exchange rate at first to the US-dollar and later to a currency basket. However, 
though radically reduced, inflation was still running much faster than in most of 
Israel's trading partner countries. In late 1989 it was decided to allow for a 
deviation of  +/- 3 percent of the exchange rate. Later the band was widened to +/- 
5 percent. The decision was mainly meant to allow for a "managed depreciation" 
rather than to add flexibility to the determination of the exchange rate. 
                                                 
20 For a detailed account of Israel's liberalization process see Gottlieb and Blejer (2000). 
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By end 1991 it was decided to change the system from a horizontal band to a 
“crawling band”. The slope of the band reflected the difference between Israel’s 
still high (some 18 percent) inflation and the low inflation of major trading 
partners. Israel’s anti-inflation policy shifted gradually to a strategy of slowly 
diminishing inflation targets. Consequently the band’s slope was also gradually 
reduced. When, during 1994, inflation and inflation expectations had sharply risen 
from 10 and 7 percent respectively to some 15 percent, Israel’s interest rate policy 
became gradually focused on the inflation target, which gained increasing public 
acceptance. In the years 1995 and 1996 inflation was gradually reduced to 7 to 10 
percent.  
In early 1995 both due to an aggressive anti-inflationary interest policy and also 
due to the surging foreign direct real and portfolio investment, Israel experienced 
large capital imports. As a result the exchange rate moved towards the lower 
(strong) boundary of the band. This movement was further enhanced by the 
Central Bank’s strategic decision to cease all intervention within the foreign 
exchange band. When, by late 1996, the exchange rate hit the lower limit of the 
band, expensive sterilization had to be carried out in order to keep monetary 
policy consistent with the inflation target. Obviously, during this period exchange 
rate volatility was artificially reduced to nil. This situation created a peculiar type 
of moral hazard. The private sector got increasingly used to disregard potential 
exchange rate risk, focusing solely on the high interest rate differential and partly 
speculating against the lower band limit, expecting it to be changed. In this period 
there was an intense argument between the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry 
about the desired degree of flexibility of the exchange rate system. The Bank 
favored exchange rate flexibility aimed at adapting to the increasingly integrated 
Israeli into the global capital market causing large and volatile capital flows to 
and from Israel. The Ministry, supported by several highly placed industrialists, 
preferred a managed nominal exchange rate depreciation. 
In mid 1997 a compromise was reached between the Central Bank and the 
government, in the course of which the Finance Minister resigned from office. It 
was deemed that the added exchange rate flexibility would help to achieve the 
inflation target in that year, which indeed was comfortably achieved. The slope of 
the band's lower limit was reduced from 6 percent to 4 percent and the upper limit 
was shifted to allow for a total bandwidth of about 30 percent, but growing over 
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time, due to the different slopes of the upper (weak) and lower limits of the band. 
Interestingly, there was much opposition at the time to the reduction of the slope 
of the lower (strong) boundary by 2 percentage points, while there was hardly any 
dispute about the 15 percent increase of the upper (weak) boundary. In the eyes of 
the contestants of exchange rate flexibility, the complacency with this change was 
motivated by the sole concern about the potential damage of nominal appreciation 
on export profitability. After a further reduction of the lower limit to 2 percent in 
August 1998, the width has reached nearly 40 percent in early 2000. 
 
B. World Financial Turmoil and the Inflation Shock 
 
When world financial turmoil affected the Israeli foreign exchange market in 
early October 1998 (together with the sharp depreciation of the Yen and other 
currencies), the depreciation immediately affected inflationary expectations, as 
measured from the difference between yields on nominal and indexed government 
bonds of the same maturity. Inflation forecasts of the business sector also surged 
immediately. 
 
The Bank of Israel reacted by a swift increase in the base interest rate of 4 
percentage points. Inflationary expectations responded quickly and fell to about 4 
to 6 percent, and continued to fluctuate around the lower level of until about 
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October 1999. Thereafter there was a further significant drop in annual 
inflationary expectations to about 2 to 4 percent. In 1999 inflation eventually 
reached the lowest rate since 1950 (excluding the year 1967), namely 1.3 percent. 
The government's inflation target for the years 2000 and 2001 has been set at 3 to 
4 percent. Private sector forecasts are at the lower end of the target range. This 
improvement towards long run price stability allowed the Bank of Israel to reduce 
interest rates gradually (in eight instances since the turmoil) by a cumulative 3.6 
percentage points. This prudent reduction amounts to 90 percent of the initial 
increase, so far without endangering the achievement of price stability or 
disrupting the financial markets. 
 
The interest rate policy, which was aimed at fighting the inflationary 
consequences of the initial depreciation, calmed the markets. 
The ultimate result of the episode in the foreign exchange market described above 
was that credibility in the monetary policy was further strengthened21. 
Judging from the latest developments in the consumer price index it is clear that 
Israeli monetary policy contributed importantly to containing inflationary 
pressures. 
                                                 
21 This is a well known result in the Mundell-Fleming framework of monetary policy 
under flexible exchange rates. 
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The main purpose of the swift and large rise in the interest rate was to preempt the 
formation of an inflationary momentum in a period of international financial 
turmoil and heightened exchange rate uncertainty. Therefore the interest rate 
instrument was used in a forward-looking manner, focusing in particular on its 
linkage with inflationary expectations and inflation forecasts, rather than trying to 
counteract the exchange rate depreciation directly. The foreign exchange market 
was intentionally left to find its market equilibrium. 
 
C. Market Forces, Official Devaluation and the Real Exchange Rate 
 
Proponents in favor of direct intervention in the foreign exchange market have 
often argued that in an open economy with "export-led growth", such as in Israel, 
the exchange rate cannot be left to market forces, particularly when market forces 
cause the exchange rate to appreciate. They argued that nominal appreciation 
eventually leads to a real appreciation and causes losses to the export industry. 
The Israeli example provides evidence on the fallacy of this argument. The real 
exchange rate has actually depreciated strongly. The initial nominal depreciation 
by 10 percent, induced by market forces in reaction to the world financial turmoil, 
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eventually brought about an even larger real depreciation22 - about 16 percent. 
The qualitative result remains valid even when the starting point is set at the 
beginning of 1996, which happens to coincide with the Bank of Israel's decision to 
float the exchange rate within the band (14 percent). 
Judging from the sizable real depreciation since the sharp nominal depreciation in 
October 1999, we may thus conclude that the success in lowering inflation did not 
come at the expense of export profitability and growth but - on the contrary - 
helped to boost exports and growth. Of course in the longer run, the reduced 
inflation tends to boost investment and improve allocative efficiency due to price 
stability. GDP growth is expected to accelerate in the year 2000 (see chart 5). 
Furthermore the reduced "pass-through" effect of exchange rate depreciation to 
inflation in a floating rate environment pays off. The inflation-target framework 
becomes more credible. Consequently, market participants expect the Central 
Bank to use the instruments of monetary policy to meet the targets and to correct 
deviations from the desired path. This credible commitment has also served to 
shorten significantly the transmission lag between monetary policy actions and 
consequences. 
                                                 
22 There are different ways to define the real exchange rate: The calculation chosen here 
is the cumulative difference between the nominal rate of depreciation to the US-dollar, 
adjusted for the inflation differential between Israel and the USA. This definition has the 
advantage of treating services as tradeables. The often used measure of "tradeables" 
versus "non-tradeables" in the home economy is particularly problematic, since 
globalization has fundamentally changed the degree of tradeability of services, which in 
the past used to be considered "non-tradeables".  
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4. Conclusions 
 
What can we learn from Israel's experience in the late 1990s? 
 
Lesson #1: Macroeconomic stability must be maintained continually 
 
Globalization is an irreversible process. The attempt to close the economy 
artificially from that process is doomed to failure. The question for economic 
policy is therefore, how the economy can prepare efficiently to the challenges 
posed by globalization. Globalization reduces frictions of international capital 
movements. This tends to amplify shocks both positively (rewards) and negatively 
(penalties). The major challenge is therefore to secure international investors' 
confidence in the domestic economy. That requires the domestic policy makers' 
knowledge of the rules governing the conduct of international investment funds. 
The focus on international investors' behavior derives not only from the size of the 
current international investment but mainly from the potential future investment 
and from the access to the domestic and international borrowing market. 
Furthermore, domestic investors' behavior (and consumers, who behave according 
their expected permanent income) is similar to investor behavior anywhere. 
Globalization therefore greatly intensifies the necessity for economic policy 
makers to adhere to international standards of sound economic policy making. 
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International rating agencies' sovereign risk ratings have thus greatly gained in 
importance in recent years. Their country reports have become an indispensable 
monitoring device for international private investors. Consequently, economic 
policy makers need to orient themselves according to the criteria, which govern 
the rating industry. Economic decisions by policy makers and market participants 
in general must be geared at absorbing external shocks. 
The best way for economic policy makers to assure this capability is to pursue a 
macroeconomic policy aimed at stability. This is a fundamental precondition for 
shielding the economy from "contagion". The strategy of insulation (reversal of 
the liberalization process), as has been suggested at some stages by a number of 
economists23, actually intensifies financial vulnerability from globalization 
because they leave the private sector unprepared to deal with risks arising from 
external shocks. The private sector remains artificially shielded from objective 
risks, inherent in the integration of the domestic economy into the world 
economy. This situation eventually becomes unsustainable. Businesses are thus 
induced to take risks, which they are not aware of at the time of their decision. 
Eventually risks might materialize at an unpredictable timing and at a high cost to 
the economy as a whole. The major goal of macroeconomic policy must therefore 
be to minimize vulnerability from global shocks. As the following chart reveals, 
this lesson was learnt the hard way by several emerging economies, which were 
hit by crises in the 1990s. 
                                                 
23 See for example P. Krugman (1998), Bhagwati (1998) and D. Rodrik (1997). 
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Of course, each country's output loss had its own idiosyncrasy, which probably 
explains some of the variance in the depth of their output losses. These losses 
varied between a total "loss" of 37 percent of GDP and 11 percent in the least 
severe case. The highest yearly loss (in midst of the crisis) varied between 21 
percent and 6 percent. 
In that comparison Israel has clearly made a better choice than the countries in the 
sample. A comparable rough calculation for Israel yields only a loss of 2 to 3 
percent (the difference between potential output growth of, say, 4 to 5 percent and 
the lowest growth rate (in 1999) of 2 percent. The comparable cumulative "loss" 
for Israel was in the vicinity of 6 percent, well below the "loss" of the best case 
(Philippines). This rough calculation suggests that a disciplined macroeconomic 
policy pays off also from the point of view of potential GDP loss minimization. 
Foreign direct investment into Israel has continued unhampered throughout world 
financial turmoil. Even foreign financial investment recovered quickly after the 
shock. Total foreign investment in Israel's business sector surged in 1999 to 4.8 
billion US-dollars and in January 2000 alone foreign investment already reached 
nearly one billion US-dollars. 
Despite these facts many have argued that the simultaneous application of tight 
monetary and fiscal policy in the course of 1994 to mid 1996 has been detrimental 
to the economy's welfare, adding unnecessarily to the slowdown in growth rates in 
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1997 to 1999 and to the rise in the rate of unemployment during 1997 to 1999. 
Domestic critics of Israel's macroeconomic policy observed that the inflation 
target throughout much of 1998 and again in 1999 had been undershot. They 
argued in favor of an "optimal policy mix" which - according to that view should 
have led to a more rapid relaxation of fiscal and monetary policy in view of output 
growing below potential24. 
When the Central Bank chose to dampen the economy in the years 1994 to 1996, 
that policy choice was highly unpopular. Politically it would have been very easy 
to abandon or "postpone" the continuation towards long run stability. The 
advantage of the "policy of permanent struggle for stability" became clear, when, 
during world financial turmoil, the economy's macroeconomic fundamentals were 
stable. The trouble with world financial turmoil is that it is inherently 
unpredictable and once it hits an unprepared economy, stability takes too much 
time and effort to be achieved. Furthermore, in such a situation the policy effort 
has to be much more ambitious, if it has to be achieved in midst of a domestic 
crisis. The policy of a "permanent struggle for stability" thus becomes the 
preferred strategy, whenever domestic economic fundamentals get out of line. 
Obviously this weakness is typical for emerging economies which are 
characterized by a basic credibility problem of government policy.  
A highly credible government may indeed use a policy mix, using one tool (say 
monetary policy) temporarily in an expansionary fashion and the other (say fiscal 
policy) in the opposite direction, with a focus on the overall effect of the policy.25 
However, the problem in an emerging economy with eroded policy credibility is 
that a policy mix with a combination of offsetting policies sends a mixed signal to 
the public. The public will tend to give a larger, myopic weight to the 
expansionary part of the policy, which will hamper policy credibility even more. 
The fact that inflation expectations in Israel during the years 1994 to mid 1997 
were consistently higher than actual inflation indicates that market participants 
                                                 
24 While there exists no authoritative number for sustainable potential growth, the growth 
rate in the years 1997 to 1999 has probably been below "potential". When the growth rate 
is adjusted for the natural slowdown, the exhaustion due to slowing immigration and the 
stalemate in the peace process from 1996 to 1998, the exaggerated per capita growth of 
more than 4 percent in 1995 and 1996 would have been slowed down anyway. The policy 
induced slowdown accounts thus only for a fraction of the observed growth decline. 
25 This is why an interest reduction during world financial turmoil in stable economies 
such as the US and UK was justly met with complacency there. 
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still perceive a latent danger for future inflationary excesses. In such a case a 
premature relaxation of monetary policy might therefore require an even more 
restrictive monetary policy in the future, to counteract the inevitable loss of 
confidence in monetary policy that would occur. 
This episode should serve as a lesson for emerging economies with limited policy 
credibility: A crisis is very costly. Even with a low probability, the expected cost 
is high, due to the high penalty inflicted by globalization. Stabilization is a time 
consuming process. Therefore it is irresponsible to react excessively to the current 
observed output gap. In Israel it took the authorities about two and a half years to 
recognize the need for restrictive fiscal policy and implement it. 
 
Lesson #2: Enhance the Flexibility of the Exchange Rate Regime 
Or - How to find a suitable exit policy. 
 
Flexibility is a sine qua non for foreign exchange markets. Any rigidity (fixed 
exchange rate rule) will hit markets in areas, which are less fit to absorb external 
shocks. The shocks will eventually need to be absorbed. Labor markets, which 
inherently lack flexibility (due to the preponderance of long term wage contracts 
and trade union power) are less suitable for that task. This does not mean that 
labor markets are not affected by external shocks - they are - but increased 
flexibility in the foreign exchange markets lets the business sector adjust more 
easily in the other markets because the foreign exchange market can provide risk 
insurance more easily than other markets. Israel's gradual and automatic widening 
of the exchange rate band towards full flexibility has proved an optimal exit 
policy from the Central Bank's official commitment to intervene and has 
strengthened its policy credibility, and therefore allowed a lower interest rate than 
would otherwise have been necessary. 
 
Lesson #3: A nominal appreciation can be consistent with a real depreciation 
 
The Israeli experience is a good example for the dichotomy between nominal and 
real exchange rates. In the decades of rapid inflation more often than not policy 
induced nominal devaluation went hand in hand with inflation, reaping any gain 
for exports in the form of real depreciation. The incident in October 1998 and the 
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immediate policy reaction brought about a different pattern. On the background of 
a sound macroeconomic policy (and at the low part of the busyness cycle) the 
market-initiated depreciation allowed for a powerful real depreciation which 
proved to be permanent, continuing at least until the present (March 2000). This 
improvement in export profitability was one of the major driving forces of the 
rapid growth in exports in 1999 (about 9 - 10 percent in real terms). This 
emphasizes the fact that what matters for export profitability is the real, not the 
nominal exchange rate. Nominal depreciations need not be inflationary if they are 
driven by market forces and accompanied by sound fiscal and monetary policy. 
  
33
References 
 
Ben-Bassat, Avraham and Daniel Gottlieb, 1992, “Optimal International Reserves 
and Sovereign Risk,” Journal of International Economics, Vol 33, pp. 345-
362. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1998, “The Capital Myth”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 77, No. 3, 
May/June, pp. 7-12. 
Cantor Richard, and Frank Packer, 1996, "Determinants and Impact of Sovereign 
Credit Ratings", FRBNY Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, October, pp. 37-53. 
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti and Nouriel Roubini, 1998, “What caused the 
Asian currency and financial crisis? Part 1: A macroeconomic overview”, 
NBER Working Paper No. 6833, December. 
Eaton Jonathan and Mark Gersovitz, 1981, "Debt with potential repudiation: 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, Review of Economic Studies Vol 48, 
289-309. 
Frenkel Jacob A., 1997, "Balance of Payments, Exchange Rates, and 
Competitiveness", Dubrovnik, Croatia, A lecture delivered on the Occasion 
of the Third Dubrovnik Conference on Transition Economies, 
www.bankisrael.gov.il, June. 
Gottlieb Daniel and Mario Blejer, 2000, "Liberalization in the Capital Account of 
Israel's Balance of Payments", (in Hebrew), forthcoming in a book on the 
Israeli Economy in the 1990s (preliminary title), eds. Avraham Ben-Bassat 
and Yoram Mayshar, Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 45 
pages. 
Gottlieb, Daniel and Sigal Ribon, 1997, (in Hebrew), Private Capital Flows and 
Monetary Policy in Israel from October 1988 to March 1997, Discussion 
Paper Series, 97.09, December, 1-40. 
Gottlieb, Daniel 1993, "On the Economic Implications of the Peace Process for 
Israel, unpublished manuscript, presented in November 1993 at a conference 
on Middle East Arms Control, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan 
University, Israel, pp. 1-30. 
Krugman, Paul 1998, "An Open Letter to Prime Minister Mahathir", WEB-SITE: 
www.mit.edu/krugman.     
—— 1998, "Saving Asia: it’s time to get radical” Fortune, September, pp. 27-31. 
—— 1998, “What Happened to Asia", WEB-SITE: www.mit.edu/krugman.     
McFadden, Daniel, Richard Eckaus, Gershon Feder, Vassilis Hajivassiliou and 
Stephen O'Connell, "Is there Life after Debt? An Econometric Analysis of 
Creditworthiness of Developing Countries" in eds. Gordon W. Smith and 
John T. Cuddington, International Debt and the Developing Countries, 
Washington D.C., The World Bank, 1986, 179-212. 
Rodrik, Dani, 1997, “Has globalization gone too far?” Institute for International 
Economics, Washington DC, March, pp. 1-108. 
 
